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Christopher McCrudden, John McGarry,
Brendan O’Leary and Alex Schwartz*
Why Northern Ireland’s Institutions Need
Stability
Northern Ireland’s consociational institutions were reviewed by a committee of
its Assembly in 2012 13. The arguments of both critics and exponents of the
arrangements are of general interest to scholars of comparative politics, power
sharing and constitutional design. The authors of this article review the debates
and evidence on the d’Hondt rule of executive formation, political designation,
the likely impact of changing district magnitudes for assembly elections, and
existing patterns of opposition and accountability. They evaluate the scholarly,
political and legal literature before commending the merits of maintaining the
existing system, including the rules under which the system might be modiﬁed
in future.
THE AGREEMENT MADE IN BELFAST ON GOOD FRIDAY 1998 IS SEEN INSIDE
and outside Northern Ireland as a dramatic success story.1 Killing and
inter-ethnic violence have long been on a downward trajectory. The
British army has reduced its presence to normal garrison levels and
plays no role in domestic security. The principal militias are no more,
or are not what they were. The Irish Republican Army (IRA) has
disbanded and disarmed, while the major loyalist paramilitary orga-
nizations have largely disarmed or dissolved into criminal networks.
‘Dissident’ republicans in the Real IRA or the Continuity IRA exist
but so far pose no comparable threat-capacity to that once possessed
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by the IRA. Likewise, fragments of the old Ulster Defence Association
(UDA) and Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF) cause friction in the
greater Belfast region. The Police Service of Northern Ireland (PSNI)
is far more broadly accepted than its predecessor, the Royal Ulster
Constabulary. The novel power-sharing institutions, which stumbled
between 1998 and 2007, now appear stable. All of Northern Ireland’s
major political parties, including the Democratic Unionist Party
(DUP) and Sinn Féin, are currently in their second consecutive term
of sharing executive power, a benchmark often associated with
democratic consolidation. All the political parties with elected
representatives support constitutional politics. The dominant view
among the region’s politicians is that important changes to the
Agreement require broad consent.
This is a novel state of affairs for a region that was once a byword
for violence and intransigence. Yet in spite of the Agreement’s
success, and in some cases because of it, its novel political institutions
have been criticized, particularly by the bi-confessional Alliance Party,
but also by the Ulster Unionist Party (UUP), the Democratic Unionist
Party, and even by the Social Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP)
and the British government. Once seen as unstable, the institutions
are now said to be ineffective (see, for example, Wilford 2009; Wilson
2009). They are condemned as obstacles to the emergence of a
post-conﬂict society in which ‘normal’ politics would occur around
bread-and-butter issues – and Europe, the euro and the environment.
The institutions allegedly reinforce ethnic and sectarian divisions and
limit the potential, not just of small bridge-building parties such as
the Alliance Party and the Greens, but of the more moderate unionist
and nationalist parties, the Ulster Unionist Party and the Social
Democratic and Labour Party, respectively. Some claim that the
institutions have contributed to increased social segregation. The
institutions are even accused of being undemocratic because they
allow all major parties into government, which is seen as inconsistent
with the strong opposition of the Westminster model of democracy.
These criticisms were the ostensible reasons behind Owen
Patterson’s decision in August 2012, when secretary of state for
Northern Ireland, to undertake a ‘consultation’ to solicit views on
increasing the effectiveness of the institutions (see Northern Ireland
Ofﬁce 2012). In response, the Assembly and Executive Review
Committee (AERC) undertook to review and report back to the
secretary of state on the use of the d’Hondt rule (for executive
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formation), community designation and the provisions for opposi-
tion parties. The consultation also addressed the issue of constituency
boundaries under (now abandoned) plans to reduce the number of
members of parliament at Westminster; the length of the Assembly’s
term and the practice of politicians holding more than one elected
ofﬁce (known locally as ‘double-jobbing’). The questions around
d’Hondt, designation and opposition, however, were the central and
most contested issues at stake (see Northern Ireland Ofﬁce 2013:
para. 27).
As long-time advocates and diagnosticians of the Agreement’s
institutions we welcomed the explicit commitment of the new
secretary of state for Northern Ireland, Teresa Villiers, to inclusive
power-sharing, and her acknowledgement that change requires
consensus. We submitted evidence to the Assembly and Executive
Review Committee suggesting that the proposed changes were
unnecessary and are pleased that the committee’s ﬁnal report
recommends no substantive changes (Northern Ireland Assembly
2013). This article elaborates the case we made, and we believe it
merits notice by scholars of comparative politics and students of
power-sharing in deeply divided places. First, however, it is necessary
to canvass the arguments made by the institutions’ critics.
CRITICISMS OF D’HONDT, DESIGNATION AND CURRENT
PROVISIONS FOR OPPOSITION
The d’Hondt ‘sequential and proportional allocation mechanism’, as
it is strictly described (see O’Leary et al. 2005), is used to allocate
10 ministries in the Northern Ireland Executive (as well as committee
chairs and deputy chairs in the Assembly). The d’Hondt divisor
(1, 2, 3 . . . n) is applied to party seat shares in order to allocate
ministerial portfolios, in exactly the same way as it is applied to party
vote shares in order to determine parliamentary seats in standard
European proportional representation systems (see, for example,
Taagepera and Shugart 1989: 32–4). All sizeable parties receive
executive posts proportionate to their share of seats in the Assembly.
The comparative novelty is that the application of the divisor is
additionally used to determine the sequence in which parties ‘pick’
ministries. The largest party gets ﬁrst pick of the ministries available,
while the next eligible party gets second pick (and so on until the
3
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available ministries are ﬁlled). From 1998 to 2007, the ﬁrst minister
and deputy ﬁrst minister were elected together by a procedure that
required cross-community consent; that is, an Assembly majority and a
concurrent majority of unionists and nationalists. Since March 2007
the two are now appointed in a procedure that is very close to the
functional equivalent of d’Hondt;2 that is, the ﬁrst minister is now the
appointee of the largest party in the Assembly, while the deputy ﬁrst
minister is the appointee of the largest party in the largest designation
(nationalist, unionist or other) apart from that of the ﬁrst minister.3
The d’Hondt system is said to be undemocratic because it alleg-
edly precludes an opposition, or alternating governments. Secretary
of State Patterson, for example, stated that there are ‘obvious ﬂaws’
in a system where ‘it is hard to remove the government by voting’; he
thought that voters should be able to decide who is in government
and who is not – the inference being that currently they do not
(AERC 2012: 224; Northern Ireland Ofﬁce 2012: para. 4.2). The
d’Hondt rule is also criticized because it guarantees ministries to
parties regardless of their preparedness to cooperate and before any
agreement on a programme of government. Others are unhappy that
‘extremists’ beneﬁt: the executive not only includes unionists and
nationalist parties, but since 2007 has been dominated by the
Democratic Unionist Party and Sinn Féin, seen as the most radical
party in each community, and this too is thought to curb effectiveness.
The former secretary of state claimed that the institutions
hinder ‘innovation’ and that an opposition would ﬁx this difﬁculty
(Northern Ireland Ofﬁce 2012: para. 4.2). The Northern Ireland
Conservatives complain of the Assembly’s apparent difﬁculties in
passing legislation, while the Ulster Unionist Party’s former leader,
Tom Elliott, claims that opposition is needed ‘to improve delivery of
public services’ (Northern Ireland Ofﬁce 2013).4 The Alliance Party
and others see the executive as unable to deliver policies to promote
a more integrated society. The institutions are said to impede a focus
on social and economic matters because of what is sometimes alleged
to be a ‘sectarian carve-up’ of government spoils between the two
leading parties. D’Hondt is criticized as an abnormal arrangement.
Indeed, the brieﬁng paper produced for the Assembly’s research and
information service describes its application as ‘unique’ to Northern
Ireland (McCaffrey and Moore 2012: 20).
The suggested remedies to these alleged defects vary. The
furthest reaching, proposed by the Democratic Unionist Party, is the
4
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replacement of the d’Hondt mechanism with a ‘voluntary coalition’
that would include nationalist and unionist parties, but not necessa-
rily all of them.5 It is hoped that this would facilitate opposition,
alternating governments, and pre-coalition bargaining on govern-
ment programmes. The last, it is said, would bolster cooperation and
democratic transparency. A less radical proposal, supported by the
Ulster Unionist Party, the Greens, the Conservatives, and the Social
Democratic and Labour Party, involves a reversion to the cross-
community method used for electing the ﬁrst minister and deputy
ﬁrst minister until 2007 – a mechanism thought to favour moderate
parties.6 Others, repeating arguments made elsewhere (McGarry
and O’Leary 2006a, 2006b), suggest that the executive, and the
Assembly’s committee chairs and deputy chairs, should be allocated
by the Sainte-Lagüe divisor (1, 3, 5 . . . n) rather than d’Hondt. The
former proportionality formula is usually considered to be fairer to
smaller parties. Rick Wilford (2013: 14–15) advocates moving to
Sainte-Lagüe, particularly in the context of a reduction in the total
number of members of the Legislative Assembly (MLAs) or executive
departments, ‘in order to sustain the inclusivity principle that
underpins the process of Executive formation’.
As a complement (or more realistically as an alternative) to
abandoning d’Hondt, critics think the Assembly should make provi-
sions for opposition that go beyond what exists currently to make the
Assembly more like some other legislatures: for example, by the
provision of special ﬁnancial assistance to parties that are in oppo-
sition, such as salaries for key opposition positions, an allocation of
key committee chairs to opposition parties, and special speaking
rights for opposition spokespersons in debates and during question
time. It has also been suggested that there could be a provision for a
vote of no-conﬁdence in the executive, as there is at Westminster,
the Scottish Parliament, the Welsh Assembly and Dáil Éireann, or,
more realistically, a vote of no-conﬁdence in particular ministers
(McCaffrey and Moore 2012: 21; Wilford 2013: 20).
A further object of criticism is the use of community designation.
Under the Northern Ireland Act 1998, members of the Assembly
are required to self-designate as ‘nationalist’, ‘unionist’ or ‘other’.
Designation enables the measurement of cross-community votes on
certain decisions. Speciﬁed ‘key’ measures – including until 2007 the
election of the ﬁrst minister and deputy ﬁrst minister – require
‘parallel consent’ (a majority in the Assembly and a concurrent
5
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majority of nationalist and unionist Assembly members) or a ‘weighted
majority’ (60 per cent of the Assembly, including at least 40 per cent of
nationalist and unionist members). Any measure before the Assembly
requires cross-community consent if it is successfully made the subject
of a ‘Petition of Concern’ signed by at least 30 members of the
Assembly.7 The St Andrews Agreement of 2006 extended the use of
designation to executive decision-making: three nationalist or unionist
members of the executive can require an executive decision to be
subject to cross-community support within the executive: the executive
equivalent of the Petition of Concern procedure.
Designation is subject to two main criticisms. One claim is that it
entrenches and institutionalizes ‘tribal politics’.8 The paucity of novel
policies is attributed in part to the use and abuse of the Petition of
Concern. Another is that designation is unfair to the ‘others’. Even
the Democratic Unionist Party, arguably the main beneﬁciary of the
current institutions, claims that designation is ‘fundamentally unde-
mocratic as it does not provide equality for all assembly members’
(see AERC 2012: 209; see also Wilford 2010). The alleged unfairness
results from the fact that, when the cross-community decision rules
apply, the votes of the ‘others’ count towards the composition of the
majority or qualiﬁed majority (60 per cent) thresholds, while the
votes of nationalists and unionists count towards both the majority or
qualiﬁed majority thresholds and, respectively, the intra-nationalist
and intra-unionist thresholds (see McGarry and O’Leary 2004).9
Some claim that designation encourages voters to support nationalist
and unionist parties at the expense of ‘others’ because voting for the
former carries more weight. Opponents of designation raise further
concerns that it may even be illegal – a breach of the European
Convention of Human Rights, which upholds the equality of citizens
as a fundamental legal right, adherence to which is a requirement
of the Agreement.10 The critics sometimes propose that cross-
community consent might be registered in an alternative ‘difference-
blind’ way that does not privilege nationalists and unionists or involve
designation. The most commonly suggested prescription is a quali-
ﬁed majority vote (QMV) of 60 or 65 per cent (in AERC 2012: 209;
Wilford 2013: 16). It has been suggested that such a vote could be
used not just to pass legislation, but to elect the executive and to
make executive decisions. The alleged problems caused by d’Hondt,
designation and petitions of concern might be addressed in one blow
(Wilford 2013: 16–18).
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DON’T BE UNFAIR TO D’HONDT
We believe, in contrast, that the use of the d’Hondt system for
executive formation should be preserved. It has functioned well.
It ensures a proportionally composed executive, one that is fairly
composed of those parties with a sufﬁcient mandate, and the decision
to take up portfolios is voluntary, though that is sometimes forgotten.
The d’Hondt mechanism provides an automatic, elegant, transparent
and democratic way of avoiding the lengthy negotiations that some-
times delay government formation in countries that use proportional
representation election systems. It avoids the delays in executive
formation in other parliamentary regimes, such as Belgium and
Iraq – after recent parliamentary elections, these two countries took
19 and 10 months, respectively, to form a government.11
The d’Hondt system is not, in fact, unique to Northern Ireland.
Named after the Belgian Viktor d’Hondt, the method is an inde-
pendent European invention of the system ﬁrst devised by Thomas
Jefferson to structure the apportioning of congressional districts
among the several states of the US (Balinski and Peyton Young 1982).
The d’Hondt divisor has been widely used in proportional repre-
sentation elections to allocate parliamentary seats in proportion
to votes won by parties (Cox 1997; Lijphart 1994; Taagepera and
Shugart 1989). It has been used to allocate committee chairs and
places in the European Parliament (Hix and Høyland 2011). Indeed,
its usage in Brussels helped inspire its adaptation by Northern
Ireland’s politicians. Even the use of d’Hondt to allocate executive
portfolios is not unique to Northern Ireland. The method has
been used in the four largest Danish municipalities of Copenhagen,
Aarhus, Odense and Aalborg, with a combined population of over
1 million people, for decades (O’Leary et al. 2005). The government
of the Brussels-Capital Region, which regulates a population larger
than that of Northern Ireland, allocates portfolios according to
the d’Hondt system, while allowing for subsequent exchanges of
portfolios.12 Variations on d’Hondt have also been contemplated as
constructive ways of resolving conﬂict in Cyprus.13
In short, the system has worked, is used and proposed elsewhere,
and is predictable. There have been no technical difﬁculties in its
use. The relevant provisions of the Northern Ireland Act 1998 (as
amended) are well drafted. The Act considered the possibility that
there could be ties among parties at various stages in the allocation
7
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process and chose to break these ties by the parties’ respective ﬁrst-
preference vote totals, thereby linking the electorate’s preferences to
the determination of ministerial portfolios in a transparent manner
that is fully in keeping with a shared democratic ethos. Northern
Ireland’s peace agreement and political institutions may be instruc-
tively compared with some recent and less successful settlements
where the parties in conﬂict agreed to share power, but not on the
details of how many ministries, or which ministries, were to go to
particular parties, and which later gave rise to conﬂict and dis-
agreement; see, for example, Kenya’s ‘Serena Accord’ signed in
February 2008, or Zimbabwe’s agreement of 2009.14
In a very constructive manner, the leading parties in Northern
Ireland agreed to meet in 2007 and 2011 to indicate how they
would express their preferences among portfolios before the actual
legal determination by the d’Hondt mechanism in the Assembly.
This decision, a welcome sign of mutual conﬁdence-building, was
intended to avoid ‘surprises’ in the formal allocation process in the
Assembly, and it enabled the parties to express and resolve whatever
anxieties they deemed ﬁt to discuss. This development was entirely
constructive, and we see no reason why it should not act as a
precedent. Nevertheless it is essential that the formal d’Hondt
mechanism be preserved to help the parties coordinate close to what
would be the default outcome if they could not agree to avoid
springing surprises on one another.
The d’Hondt mechanism is also strongly inclusive. All parties with
a signiﬁcant electoral mandate beneﬁt; they can then get automatic
access to the executive if that is what they seek, provided that they
bind themselves to democratic and peaceful politics through the
pledge of ofﬁce. No other party can veto their presence; differently
put, no one can veto the inclusion of those with a mandate from the
voters. This feature of the d’Hondt system is exceptionally important
in a place as deeply divided as Northern Ireland. Government
formation would have been extraordinarily difﬁcult if the parties
had been obliged to negotiate not only over the number of portfolios
and their allocation but also over which parties would comprise
the executive and which ministers would be allocated to which
ministerial portfolios.
The d’Hondt system is also democratically fair. Other things being
equal, the party which wins more votes wins a stronger presence in
the executive. The executive has not been deadlocked by micro-parties,
8
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which famously have had excessive ‘pivotality’ in countries such as
Israel. It is true that the d’Hondt divisor beneﬁts larger parties
(slightly) more than other divisors that could be used for executive
portfolio allocation (such as Sainte-Lagüe). Indeed, among the
family of possible divisors, d’Hondt is the most frequently used
precisely because it beneﬁts larger parties. Yet it can also be justiﬁed
from an institutional-design perspective because, in a modest way, it
discourages excessive party fragmentation.
While some among us have supported both d’Hondt and Sainte-
Lagüe, none of us sees any strong case at present for changing the
formula in Northern Ireland from d’Hondt to Sainte-Lagüe. That the
Democratic Unionist Party and Sinn Féin have been the recent
beneﬁciaries of a rule that was initially agreed in negotiations
between the Ulster Unionist Party and the Social Democratic and
Labour Party is not a principled reason to change the system. The
case that used to be made for Sainte-Lagüe was partly based on the
idea that it would help to include the Democratic Unionist Party
and Sinn Féin, then the second largest parties of their respective
community designations – a need that is now otiose.
Sainte-Lagüe, contrary to some local wisdom, would not in any
case signiﬁcantly help the ‘others’, the parties which choose not to
self-designate as ‘nationalist’ or ‘unionist’. Had Sainte-Lagüe been
used instead of d’Hondt to allocate ministries after the last Assembly
election in 2011, the ministerial allocation would have been the same
(although Alliance would have been able to pick the eighth ministry
instead of the tenth). Given recent speculation about reducing the
size of the Assembly,15 and the size of the executive,16 it is worth
testing how a switch to Sainte-Lagüe would affect the fortunes of
the ‘others’. We have a reasonably accurate way of predicting seat
allocation in a future Assembly with a smaller district magnitude,
assuming that voters vote as they did in 2011. This is because the best
simple predictor of the number of seats a party will win in a multi-
member constituency under PR-STV is the number of ‘Droop’ quotas
(1/(n + 1) + 1) it has at the ﬁrst stage of the count (where n is the
number of people to be elected in the constituency). In Tables 1 to 4
we have extrapolated from the 2011 elections by calculating the
approximate number of Droop quotas that would be won by each
party if there were ﬁve or four candidates to be elected per con-
stituency instead of six, as at present, using the size of these quotas to
predict outcomes.17
9
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If the size of the Assembly was reduced from 108 members to 90 –
that is, from a district magnitude of 6 members to 5 – the contrasting
results from d’Hondt and Sainte-Lagüe can be seen in Tables 1 and 2.
The ‘others’ would win only 1 of 10 ministries, as at present,
regardless of whether d’Hondt or Sainte-Lagüe were used. But if the
size of the executive in a 90-member Assembly was reduced from
10 ministers to 6, the ‘others’ would be shut out of the executive
under both d’Hondt and Sainte-Lagüe.
If the Assembly was reduced to 72 members (a district magnitude
of 4) – as called for by the Democratic Unionist Party – and the
Table 1
Simulating a 10 Member D’Hondt Executive in an Assembly of 90 Members
DUP UUP APNI SDLP SF
Divisors Seats M Seats M Seats M Seats M Seats M
1 31.0 1 10.0 7 8.0 9 13.0 4 25.0 2
2 15.5 3 5.0 4.0 6.5 12.5 5
3 10.3 6 8.3 8
4 7.8 10 6.3
5 6.2
Total ministries 4 1 1 1 3
Note: In a six member executive the Alliance Party and Ulster Unionist Party
win no places, and unionists and nationalists have parity.
Key to all tables: DUP=Democratic Unionist Party; UUP=Ulster Unionist
Party; APNI=Alliance Party of Northern Ireland; SDLP= Social Democratic
and Labour Party; SF= Sinn Féin; M=Order of pick for ministerial portfolio.
All simulations assume the ﬁrst preference vote share won by parties in 2011.
Table 2
Simulating a 10 Member Sainte Lagüe Executive in an Assembly of 90 Members
DUP UUP APNI SDLP SF
Divisors Seats M Seats M Seats M Seats M Seats M
1 31.0 1 10.0 5 8.0 7 13.0 3 25.0 2
3 10.3 4 3.3 2.6 4.3 8.3 6
5 6.2 8 5.0 9
7 4.4 10 3.5
9 3.4
Total ministries 4 1 1 1 3
Note: In a six member executive the Alliance Party wins no places, and
unionists and nationalists have parity.
10
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executive was kept at 10 ministers, then ‘others’ would again receive
only one ministry, whether d’Hondt or Sainte-Lagüe was used (see
Tables 3 and 4). If the executive was reduced to six ministries,
the ‘others’ would lose out completely under either d’Hondt or
Sainte-Lagüe. A reduction in the size of the Assembly would also
affect the ‘others’ share of seats. If voters voted as they did in 2011 for
a 90-member Assembly, the percentage share of ‘others’ would rise
Table 3
Simulating a 10 Member D’Hondt Executive in an Assembly of 72 Members
DUP UUP APNI SDLP SF
Divisors Seats M Seats M Seats M Seats M Seats M
1 26.0 1 *11.0 5 5 *11.0 4 18.0 2
2 13.0 3 5.5 5.5 10 9.0 6
3 8.7 7 3.7 6.0 9
4 6.5 8 4.5
5 5.2
Total ministries 4 1 0 2 3
Notes: *When two or more parties are tied in number of members, the
tie breaker is the number of ﬁrst preference votes.
In a six member executive the Alliance Party wins no places, and unionists
and nationalists have parity.
Table 4
Simulating a 10 Member Sainte Lagüe Executive in an Assembly of 72 Members
DUP UUP APNI SDLP SF
Divisors Seats M Seats M Seats M Seats M Seats M
1 26.0 1 11.0 4 5.0 8 11.0 3 18.0 2
3 8.7 5 *3.7 1.7 *3.7 10 6.0 6
5 5.2 7 2.2 2.2 3.6
7 *3.7 9
9 2.9
Total ministries 4 1 1 2 2
Notes: When two or more parties are tied in number of members, the
tie breaker is the number of ﬁrst preference votes. In Table 4 the DUP
precedes both the SDLP and the UUP because the 3.7 seats won by the DUP
results from rounding down, whereas the 3.7 won by the SDLP and the UUP
results from rounding up.
In a six member executive the Alliance Party wins no places, and unionists
and nationalists have parity.
11
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to 11.1 per cent from 9.3 per cent at present, but their number of
members in the Assembly would stay the same. However, if the
Assembly was reduced to 72, the percentage share of ‘others’ would
fall from 9.3 per cent at present to just 6.9 per cent, and the single
seat the Greens currently hold would be eliminated.
The moral is straightforward: Sainte-Lagüe cannot materially help
the ‘others’, and the shift to a smaller executive would damage them
while simultaneously increasing the chances of parity on the execu-
tive between unionists and nationalists. Signiﬁcantly reducing the size
of the Assembly to 72 members would make it more difﬁcult to
maintain proportionality, and it would damage the ‘others’. Anyone
who is genuinely interested in helping the ‘others’, including the
‘others’ themselves, should argue against signiﬁcant cuts to the size of
the executive and Assembly, rather than for a switch from d’Hondt to
Sainte-Lagüe.18
Without the inclusionary mechanisms of the d’Hondt system, the
largest political parties currently in Northern Ireland would have
found it far more difﬁcult to have reached a stable accommodation.
We have seen remarkable changes in the Democratic Unionist Party
and Sinn Féin in recent years. Great care should be taken to avoid
the premature dismantling of the institutional machinery that helped
make this accommodation possible.
The debate about d’Hondt is a sub-set of a larger debate over
which model of democracy is most effective for divided places – the
winner-takes-all type, illustrated by the traditional Westminster
model; or the consensual (or proportional) model, perhaps best
illustrated by contemporary Belgium (Lijphart 2012). Under winner-
takes-all, governments or cabinets endorsed by bare majorities in
the legislature, ‘minimum winning coalitions’, are seen as virtuous.
The government is held to account by a recognized opposition, and the
electorate is provided with an alternative government-in-waiting. But
this model, some forget, applied to the Northern Ireland parliament
between 1929 and 1972 (McCrudden 1994; O’Leary and McGarry
1993) and proved deeply divisive because there was a permanent
governing majority. None of the beneﬁts that might have ﬂowed
from alternation in government was available. In any case, the
Westminster Parliament has presided over changes in the UK’s
political system that signiﬁcantly depart from the full winner-takes
all model – in Scotland and Wales, in elections to the European
Parliament, in some local and regional institutions and election
12
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systems, and in the UK’s legal institutions (see, for example, King
2001; Morrison 2001). There have also been minor modiﬁcations
to the parliamentary committee system. Against this context, it is
perplexing to hear calls to make Northern Ireland look more like the
Westminster model. These demands seem archaic, out of tune with
the UK trajectory, and literally reactionary.
The consensual type of democracy places a much higher value on
inclusivity and power-sharing, and makes consociation feasible. Great
care, in our view, should be taken in modifying or dissolving con-
sociational institutions, especially when they have proved their worth
in helping to ameliorate conﬂict and deliver stable government. That
is why we share the current secretary of state’s view that any changes
to the institutions must be consistent with the power-sharing and
inclusive values of the Agreement, and its rules for change.
OPPOSITION AND ACCOUNTABILITY
The d’Hondt system does not oblige an all-party, comprehensive or
‘grand coalition’. Any party is free to choose to go into opposition.
The fact that there are ﬁve parties in the current executive is a choice,
not one forced by the rules. The constraint is that no party can
demand the exclusion (or inclusion) of other parties, and other rules,
not based on d’Hondt, render non-viable an executive without both
nationalists and unionists. Through the d’Hondt system, the parties
entitled to ministerial portfolios have their entitlements determined
by the electorate, though this too is misrepresented by the claim that
voters cannot change the government. In the future one can imagine
any of the ﬁve largest parties going into opposition by refusing to take
up its entitlements to portfolios on the executive. It is also possible to
imagine the governing coalition narrowing or broadening, as happened
in 2011, or the parties that are entitled to assume the positions of ﬁrst
minister and deputy ﬁrst minister changing, as happened in 2007.
A party’s share of ministries may be reduced or increased, as has
happened at every election. All that d’Hondt excludes is a government
that is not broadly inclusive of voters’ preferences.
The current institutions provide for ministerial accountability
through statutory or departmental committees. The Northern Ireland
Act 1998 does not permit ministers, or junior ministers, to become
chairs or deputy chairs of these committees and, in making a
13
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nomination for chair or deputy chair, the nominating ofﬁcer ‘shall
prefer a committee in which he does not have a party interest to one
in which he does’. This means that parties are obliged not to nomi-
nate chairs or deputy chairs of committees monitoring ministers who
come from their party, which in turn means that during committee
hearings and Assembly debates ministers are faced by committee
chairs and deputy chairs from other parties (see Northern Ireland
Assembly 2013: 11). These chairs and deputy chairs have good
reasons to hold the relevant minister to account and are likely to be
in receipt of both formal and informal information to enable them to
perform their tasks well. Furthermore, the existing arrangements
permit a party that does not take up its entitlement to executive
portfolios to continue to nominate its members to chair and deputy-
chair committees in the relevant d’Hondt sequential order. This
system certainly does not punish a decision to go into opposition, and
has no counterpart in the Westminster model. In the latter, or rela-
ted winner-takes-all systems, it has been rare for opposition parties to
chair anything other than public accounts committees. Governments
in such systems have usually been very careful to maintain control
over virtually all committees. In this respect, Northern Ireland’s
arrangements are both more inclusive and, at least potentially, more
amenable to a scrutinized executive.
Opposition is also facilitated by the relatively low ratio of executive
members to non-executive members of the Legislative Assembly.
When there are two ﬁrst ministers, ten ministers and two junior
ministers, then approximately 13 per cent of the Assembly members
are in the government. That leaves 87 per cent of the Assembly
outside the executive. Typically, each ministerial member of the
executive faces a committee composed of a majority from other
parties, hardly a position that automatically favours the executive.
Precisely because Northern Ireland’s ‘programme of government’
and the other obligations ministers owe one another, legal and
prudential, are not as binding as those imposed by rigorous collective
cabinet responsibility under winner-takes-all, we suggest that ministers
are possibly more exposed to criticism (by MLAs whose parties are
also in the executive, as well as without) than their Westminster
counterparts. We are therefore not persuaded that the current
arrangements deprive Northern Ireland of constructive opposition.
Northern Ireland is governed differently from the rest of the UK
partly because it is different. One clear difference is the effective joint
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leadership embedded in the ﬁrst minister and deputy ﬁrst minister.
There can be no meaningful singular leader of the opposition to
these two post-holders without generating the spectacle of a ﬁrst
leader of the opposition and a deputy ﬁrst leader of the opposition.
The ﬁrst minister and deputy ﬁrst minister jointly run the executive,
but only control their own party’s ministers on the executive. This,
and the fact that the ﬁrst and deputy ﬁrst ministers represent
different parties, constitutes a double constraint on what some have
called the prime-ministerialization of parliamentary government: the
centralization of control over the executive and legislature in the
hands of an all-powerful prime-minister (see Dunleavy and Rhodes
1995; Dunleavy et al. 1990; Poguntke and Webb 2005).
The ﬁrst minister and deputy ﬁrst minister are open to inter-
pellation. They answer questions for half an hour on Mondays.
Answers are rotated sequentially between the two post-holders.
Members of the Assembly do not decide which of them answers their
questions. The Speaker determines which questions are to be asked
through random computer selection. At least regarding Question
Time, we think that creating occasions for more dramatic debating
pyrotechnics would increase heat more than light and would not
necessarily be good for the people of Northern Ireland, who might
beneﬁt from some dullness in executive–legislative relations.
An impressive study by Richard Conley (2013) regarding the
questioning of ministers in the Assembly demonstrates a decline in the
number of questions posed over the period 2007–11, but convincingly
shows that the cause was not increasing executive reluctance to be
questioned. Rather, recent Northern Ireland experience reﬂects the
successful determination of the Assembly to obtain more substantive
answers fromministers through procedural reforms that decreased the
number of questions, and expanded the time available for ministers to
answer. Conley’s other ﬁndings included the following items:
∙ The ﬁrst minister and deputy ﬁrst minister, who have no control
over the questions they face, give substantive answers and do not
refer matters to other ministers. They are, however, given ample
time to prepare under Standing Orders that oblige them to answer
clearly and fully (a clear shift from Westminster-style adversary
politics).
∙ The Social Democratic and Labour Party’s and the Ulster Unionist
Party’s members of the Assembly were the most active in holding
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the executive to account on general government questions (more
than 20 per cent of the Social Democratic and Labour Party’s and
more than 30 per cent of the Ulster Unionist Party’s questions
concerned the functioning of the executive). These data suggest,
in Conley’s words, that the ‘minor designated parties often
assumed the role of the “loyal opposition” ’.
∙ The members of the Assembly systematically vary by party regarding
what subjects they raise (for example, Sinn Féin’s specialty is in social
policy, whereas the Alliance Party focuses on social cohesion).
∙ Constituency concerns constituted a full one-third of the questions
posed to the ﬁrst minister and deputy ﬁrst minister.
This research suggests a maturing consociational system, attuned to
Northern Ireland’s political requirements, in which the need to
incentivize ‘cooperation’ has been successfully balanced against the
beneﬁts of incentivizing ‘accountability’.
It would be perverse in a deeply divided polity if the Assembly
sought to reward parties for opposing rather than cooperating,
when they can currently do both. The consociational principle of
proportionality suggests that parties should have resources com-
mensurate with their popular support. It would be odd to reward
largely uncalled-for adversary politics by giving those who deliberately
go into opposition, or who fail to win signiﬁcant electoral support,
disproportionate resources. There is therefore no clear need to
enhance the resources (whether in money, time or positions) of
exclusively opposition parties as opposed to enhancing the research
and information-processing capabilities of all Assembly members
(for example, through giving them the capability to hire more
highly skilled assistants to aid them in scrutinizing policy issues
and the public administration, as opposed to constituency matters).
Non-executive parties in opposition should have no more call on
public resources than a consistent proportionality rule would suggest
(and members of the Assembly from parties in the executive should
enjoy the same, proportional, support). Similarly, time allocated
for non-executive business should be proportionally linked to the
size of non-executive parties. If opposition proves popular, then a
decision to go into it will be automatically rewarded, which is entirely
consistent with democratic and consociational principles.
We are also not persuaded that there should be more opportunities
for ‘votes of no conﬁdence’. Under Sections 32(1) and 32(2) of the
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Northern Ireland Act 1998 the Assembly may dissolve itself through a
qualiﬁed majority of two-thirds of Assembly members. Additional
election triggers are not needed. Elections will remain polarized in
Northern Ireland for the foreseeable future. There is no need to
increase their number or frequency (although occasionally elections
may be needed to resolve a deep crisis within the executive). It
remains true that under Section 32(3) of the Northern Ireland Act
1998 (as amended) that the ﬁrst minister or the deputy ﬁrst minister
can trigger an election if they resign and their party refuses to ﬁll the
vacated post. We would prefer that the resignation of either a ﬁrst
minister or a deputy ﬁrst minister could not take place without the
relevant party having ﬁrst nominated the successor. Executive stability
is a good thing. Northern Ireland certainly does not need to become
like France’s Fourth Republic or Italy’s First Republic, with ‘revolving
door governments’, often with the same personnel simply moved
around ministerial ofﬁces.
Regarding the proposal for votes of no-conﬁdence in particular
ministers, there is already provision to admonish and suspend ministers
in breach of the pledge of ofﬁce. With cross-community consent a
party can be excluded from access to the ofﬁce if it has breached the
pledge of ofﬁce. Is more needed? Our perspective is that the d’Hondt
executive formation system in Northern Ireland is closely analogous
to Switzerland’s election of its federal executive council. Though the
Swiss voting is majoritarian in form, it is consensual in substance, and
once the federal executive council has been elected it is like a pre-
sidency (Steiner 1982); that is, it cannot normally be replaced until the
next general election. Likewise in Northern Ireland, the appropriate
way to conceive of the emerging political system is that the public,
through its votes, determines Northern Ireland’s executive for the next
legislative term. Parties may replace individual ministers and are wise
to do so if their ministers are inadequate or have been engaged in
maladministration. They should surely suffer electoral retribution if
they do not replace ministers who have disgraced themselves. This
should be sufﬁcient incentive for them to act accordingly.
DESIGNATION
A foundational component of the April 1998 Agreement, endorsed
by the referendum of May 1998 in both parts of Ireland, is the use of
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community designation rules to protect the distinctive interests of
nationalists and unionists. Though the designation rules are criticized
for reifying division and for being unfair to those who do not identify
with either of the two main communities, these criticisms, and the
associated proposals for change, are either misguided or premature.
Discussion of the designation rules must be informed by an
understanding of the tension between sometimes competing con-
sociational principles, namely, parity between the consociational
partners as communities, and proportionality as an electoral, repre-
sentational and allocation rule (McCrudden and O’Leary 2013a:
14ff). Proportionality as such (for example, through the single
transferable vote in multimember constituencies to elect MLAs, or
d’Hondt to allocate executive portfolios and committee positions)
does not prevent one community from being consistently outvoted
according to simple majority voting procedures. Designation was
intended to complement proportionality with parity, preventing one
community from being dominated by the other, both now, and in the
future should there be a demographic and electoral reversal of
community fortunes. The Northern Ireland Act 1998, as amended,
produces parity by obliging concurrent majority support or weighted
cross-community consent on speciﬁc matters that affect the vital
interests of the partners – this is achieved through designation.
As things stand, the designation rules play two different and
important roles. First, they have been adapted to solve the problem of
executive leadership. Experience between 1998 and 2002 taught
members of the Legislative Assembly that the use of the concurrent
majority requirement for the election of the ﬁrst and deputy ﬁrst
ministers demanded too much of the partners (and of the ‘others’, in
extremis).19 Thus the rules for electing the ﬁrst minister and the
deputy ﬁrst minister were modiﬁed with wide consent, and these
rules have so far worked well. Signiﬁcantly, they do not prevent those
who choose not to identify with either the nationalist or unionist
designation from holding either of the ofﬁces in question. If the
‘others’ made up the largest party they would nominate the ﬁrst
minister. If they were to provide the largest party in the largest
designation other than that of the ﬁrst minister, then they would
nominate the deputy ﬁrst minister. In short, the rules prevent
the leadership of the executive from being captured by a single
community without excluding those who prefer not to designate as
nationalist or unionist. Insofar as ‘designation’ is used for the
18
© The Authors 2014. Published by Government and Opposition Limited and Cambridge University Press
appointment of the ﬁrst minister and deputy ﬁrst minister, we see no
need for reform.
The other role of designation is to manage ‘key’ decisions or
decisions subjected to the Petition of Concern. The underlying
rationale for these rules is to protect the interests of the two
historically largest and most antagonistic communities by allowing
each group’s representatives to veto important proposed decisions
when they do not attract a signiﬁcant degree of cross-community
agreement. In keeping with this rationale, the rules make it impos-
sible for the votes of any single party, regardless of how many seats it
holds, to be both necessary and sufﬁcient for a winning coalition on
any vote to which the decision rule applies.
These rules are criticized for being unfair to the ‘others’. There is
some truth to this claim: when the cross-community decision-rules
apply, the votes of ‘others’ are demonstrably less pivotal (Schwartz
2010). But what are the alternatives? One that can be dismissed
briskly is to give ‘others’ a parallel role as a designated community in
cross-community consent procedures. This proposal would give
excessive weight to the ‘others’ voting power in the Assembly in
relation to their support among the electorate. As importantly, the
‘others’ have not sought any such change. On current electoral
trends, without any cross-community consent procedures and with an
Assembly run on simple majority rules, the ‘others’ would probably
be disproportionally ‘pivotal’ in the Assembly in the decade ahead, in
the same way that small parties in Germany or Israel have frequently
punched above their electoral weight in executive and legislative
decision-making. There is no compelling evidence that the current
rules have so far functioned as disincentives for voters contemplating
support for the ‘others’: support for the latter increased slightly in
net terms in the 15 years since the 1998 Agreement, whereas it had
fallen in the 15 years before the Agreement. Any argument that
possible growth in support for the ‘others’ has been held back by the
rules rests on highly speculative counterfactuals.
Another proposed alternative is to introduce an ostensibly
‘difference-blind’ qualiﬁed majority decision rule: that is, one which
makes no use of community designation. Any such revision would
have to set a qualiﬁed majority threshold consistent with the rationale of
blocking decisions that lack a signiﬁcant amount of nationalist and
unionist support. This is a more plausible suggestion, but, however the
threshold is set, there are inevitable and problematic trade-offs involved.
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On the one hand, a relatively low threshold – say 60 per cent – is a
relatively less reliable means for blocking decisions that lack de facto
cross-community consent. Given the current composition of the
Assembly, for example, a 60 per cent threshold would not be a very
secure guarantee for nationalists. The total number of nationalist
Assembly members is 43 – about 39.8 per cent of the Assembly. Thus,
a decision which attracted no nationalist support whatsoever could
still pass. On the other hand, a higher qualiﬁed majority threshold –
say 65 per cent – risks giving a single party the power to block any
motion or bill it chooses, regardless of the subject matter. Under a
65 per cent threshold, again assuming the current composition of the
Assembly, the Democratic Unionist Party alone (which currently has
38 seats, or 35.1 per cent of the Assembly) would be necessary to any
possible winning coalition of votes. In other words, the Democratic
Unionist Party would have its very own veto (a party veto, that is, not a
designated community veto), even though its support falls well short
of a majority of the voters. Moreover, because the Democratic
Unionist Party would also have more than 30 seats, the party could
unilaterally activate this veto by organizing a Petition of Concern.
Meanwhile, the voting power of the second largest party, currently
Sinn Féin with 29 seats, could be effectively nulliﬁed if all the
remaining parties were to vote against its preferences en bloc.
Because the second largest party is (and is often likely to be) also
the largest of the two nationalist parties, a winning coalition that
excluded that party would have less than 50 per cent support among
the nationalist bloc. This possibility runs counter to the Agreement’s
principle of inclusivity. Such a change would also signiﬁcantly alter
the bargaining power of the parties in the Assembly. As things stand,
both the votes of the Democratic Unionist Party and Sinn Féin (who
each currently have more than 50 per cent of the seats from their
respective community designations) are necessary for any possible
winning coalition under either of the two cross-community consent
procedures (Schwartz 2010: 356–7). The current provisions therefore
give these leading designation parties relatively equal veto bargaining
power (‘parity’). Requiring a difference-blind qualiﬁed majority rule
beyond two-thirds of the Assembly’s members might also generate
additional pathologies, beyond those predicted here, as and when
legislative consent requirements approached unanimity. We there-
fore caution strongly against any precipitate change to the rules
relating to key decisions.
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The language of ‘difference-blind’ rules is in any case misleading.
In a place as highly politicized as Northern Ireland, intelligent
politicians, parties and communities are more than capable of
knowing whether they are likely to stand to lose or gain under various
‘difference-blind’ rules. The current situation is not one in which the
parties are blind to their likely future strengths and weaknesses under
any new rules. For that reason we are inclined to doubt that there is
likely to be cross-community consent to change the cross-community
consent rules, as would be required by the mandate of the 1998
Agreement. We cannot identify a qualiﬁed majority decision-making
rule likely to be agreed as an equilibrium outcome by a majority
among nationalists, unionists and ‘others’, respectively.
More speciﬁc criticisms of the Petition of Concern mechanism are
also overstated or misplaced. There is a perception that the proce-
dure is being used at an increasingly frequent rate, contributing to
the alleged ineffectiveness of Northern Ireland’s institutions. This
perception is not entirely accurate. It is true that during the ﬁrst
several years of post-Agreement devolution – from 2 December 1999
until the Assembly’s temporary suspension from 14 October 2002 –
the Petition of Concern was used more sparingly (see McCaffrey
2013: Table 3). Yet, since the Assembly’s powers were restored in May
2007, the frequency with which the procedure is used has remained
steady, averaging out at 5.5 uses per year over the course of both the
2007–11 mandate and the 2011–15 mandate.20 Furthermore, the
procedure has been used to block divisive motions, typically of only
symbolic or expressive importance, more frequently than it has been
used to block actual lawmaking (McCaffrey 2013: Figure 1). Mean-
while, the Assembly has successfully enacted 82 pieces of legislation
since its powers were restored in 2007.21 This is hardly the picture of
gridlock that the critics like to depict. In fact, the Assembly’s legis-
lative output compares favourably with its Scottish counterpart at
Holyrood. Over the same period, the Scottish Parliament (which
enjoys a wider range of competencies than the Northern Ireland
Assembly and has no equivalent to the Petition of Concern) enacted
only eight more pieces of legislation (even though it had a one-party
majority government during some of this period).22 In sum, and
contrary to the doomsayers, the Petition of Concern does not appear
to have made the Assembly relatively less productive.
Although the Petition of Concern can apply to any decision of the
Assembly, it has generally been used as it ought to be: to manage
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divisive issues relating to nationalist or unionist culture and political
identity,23 the institutions set up under the Agreement24 or the legacy
of the conﬂict.25 The procedure is open to abuse; it has occasionally
been used to block decisions which have nothing to do with
community-speciﬁc nationalist or unionist interests.26 But there are
remedies for this mischief which do not involve reverting to simple
majoritarian decision-making. For example, the Assembly might
consider ways in which its presiding ofﬁcer, in conjunction with a
suitably composed committee of the Assembly, could be empowered
to inhibit pseudo-Petitions of Concern. Such measures might curb
the potential for abuse without going so far as to scrap the procedure,
with all its attendant beneﬁts.
LEGAL ISSUES
Regardless of the political, ethical or prudential grounds for desig-
nation, the possibility has been raised that the measures could be
legally challenged. Some courts are indeed developing a habit
of undoing, on legal, rights-based grounds, careful political com-
promises that are aimed at securing fairness, peace and political
stability (McCrudden and O’Leary 2013a). Such undoing, however, is
unlikely in Northern Ireland’s case. Below we focus on the legal
implications, particularly of the European Convention on Human
Rights, for the current arrangements.
Two issues should be distinguished. The ﬁrst is whether the mere
requirement of parties to register as unionist, nationalist or other is
itself a breach of human rights requirements under Article 8 of the
Convention, which protects the right to private life, or Article 9,
which protects freedom of religion. The relevant case law poses no
threat to the requirement on parties to choose a designation in the
Assembly. The cases in which the European Court of Human Rights
has objected to requirements to disclose afﬁliations and identities
have all involved the forced disclosure of religious or ethnic iden-
tities, and it is not at all clear that the Court would regard unionist,
nationalist or other as ethnic let alone religious classiﬁcations. Even if
the Court were to view the designations as ethnic classiﬁcations, the
other elements of these past cases would come into play. All the
relevant cases in which claims have been successful have involved
individual designation, but the designation requirements for the
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Assembly relate primarily to political parties, not to individuals. Party
designations in the Assembly are chosen, based on self-identiﬁcation,
rather than imposed. There can be no objection to the procedural
fairness of the process of designation. Given the strong prudential
justiﬁcations for the system of designation, it would constitute a
dramatic departure from precedent if the Court regarded the
Assembly designation requirements as by themselves contrary to the
Convention.
The second major legal issue is whether the provisions for
executive formation and for passing key legislation amount to a
breach of the Convention, speciﬁcally Article 3 of Protocol 1 (the
right to fair elections) taken alone or in combination with Article 14
(the prohibition of discrimination). Regarding the arrangements
for the appointment of the executive, the legal position is straight-
forward. Article 3 of Protocol 1 does not apply to executive formation,
only to the right to vote for, and to be elected to, the Assembly.
Article 14 also does not apply because it is not a stand-alone
prohibition of discrimination; it has to engage some other right.
Article 3 of Protocol 1 seems to be the only possible candidate, but, as
we have seen, it does not apply. So there appears to be no legal basis
for challenging executive formation under human rights law. In any
event, as noted, the d’Hondt system that is used for the allocation of
ministries makes no use of community designation; it does not, on
its face, allocate according to religion, ethnicity or even political
identity; neither does it exclude the ‘others’ from gaining ministerial
portfolios. Indeed it is more conducive to small parties like the
‘others’ receiving ministerial portfolios than the Westminster system
or the devolution arrangement in Scotland and Wales, all of which
require a party to win a majority of seats in the legislature, or join a
coalition with such a majority, before being entitled to ministries
(McGarry and O’Leary 2009). Regarding the election of the ﬁrst
minister and deputy ﬁrst minister, the rule agreed at St Andrews in
2006 abandoned a practice – the requirement for each position to be
elected by cross-community consent – which effectively ruled out a
candidate from the ‘others’. Now the election rule for each position
is neutral. All that stops the ‘others’ from winning the position of ﬁrst
minister or deputy ﬁrst minister is insufﬁcient support from the
electorate. It is true that the ‘others’ cannot win the position of ﬁrst
minister and deputy ﬁrst minister, but neither can the ‘unionists’
or ‘nationalists’. It is passing strange that some of the critics of
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designation are troubled with the changes made at St Andrews and
appear to favour a return to previous provisions for electing the ﬁrst
and deputy ﬁrst ministers that rely on designation and exclude the
‘others’.
What about measures for passing key legislation in the Assembly
that require designation, and therefore privilege the position of
‘nationalists’ and ‘unionists’? Do these amount to a breach of Article
3 of Protocol 1 of the Convention, on the ground that a vote cast by a
voter for a candidate of a party that will register as ‘others’ is of less
value than that of a voter voting for a unionist or nationalist candi-
date? The answer to this question is more complicated because
clearly Article 1 of Protocol 1 does apply and, therefore, Article 14,
prohibiting discrimination, applies as well, unlike in the context of
the selection of the executive or the ﬁrst and deputy ﬁrst ministers. It
is also more complicated because of the decision of the European
Court of Human Rights (2009) in the Sejdić and Finci v Bosnia case, in
which aspects of the constitutional arrangements agreed at Dayton to
settle the civil war in Bosnia were successfully challenged. The decision
of the Court was that constitutional prohibitions on non-constituent
peoples – Bosnia’s ‘others’ – from being able to stand for the upper
house of the federal parliament were contrary to the convention
insofar as they prevented a self-identiﬁed Jew and Roma who did not
wish to self-identify as one of the constituent peoples (Serbs, Bosniaks,
Croats) from standing. Northern Ireland’s ‘others’ by contrast do not
have to decide to be nationalists or unionists to be eligible for ofﬁce.
In sum, Northern Ireland’s legislative arrangements would prob-
ably survive a challenge on these grounds under the Convention. The
rules on designation are not based on ethnicity or religion, but on
political opinion or national identiﬁcation. Given that no ‘suspect
classiﬁcation’ (such as ethnicity or religion) is used, the Court is not
required to give these provisions any heightened scrutiny. Instead,
the default rule is likely to apply – that is, that electoral systems,
the right to vote and the right to be elected are matters within
national competence and expertise, to which the Court generally
gives a very wide margin of appreciation. It would also be relevant
that Northern Ireland’s Agreement, unlike the Dayton Accords, was
subject to democratic approval by referendum. Whatever the merits
or demerits of the existing arrangements on political, prudential or
ethical grounds, there is no good reason under equality or human
rights law to depart from them.
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CONCLUSION
There is much accumulated wisdom in Northern Ireland’s current
institutional arrangements; they are the product of several years of
political experimentation, much learning and many agreed com-
promises achieved after long negotiations. We have counselled in
these circumstances for a conservative approach to institutional
design – even ostensibly minor reforms may have unintended and
undesirable consequences.
Some of the Agreement’s harsher critics are unable or unwilling to
acknowledge any of the gains it has made possible. They think
the institutions should be reformed because there has been no
progress, or believe that Northern Ireland is as divided as it was in
1976 or more divided than ever. Others are prepared to credit the
Agreement with some progress, but think that Northern Ireland is
now less divided than it once was and that it is safe to remodel its new
institutions. It is not possible that both of these outlooks are correct.
Our view is that Northern Ireland has achieved a great deal under the
Agreement, but that its progress remains fragile. One does not have
to accept the absurd position that it is more polarized now than
before the Agreement to appreciate that it remains a divided place.
The prudent path is cautious system maintenance. Though we are
outspoken proponents of consociational democracy for Northern
Ireland, we do not insist that consociational institutions must be
permanent ﬁxtures of life. There may be a time for substantial
changes, but that time is not now.
NOTES
1 For an account of the provisions of the Agreement see O’Leary (1999); see also the
other contributions to ‘Analysis of the Northern Ireland Peace Agreement’ (1999).
2 Northern Ireland (St Andrews Agreement) Act 2006 c. 53, Part 2 Ministerial
appointments, Section 8, amending the Northern Ireland Act 16A, 16B, 16C see
especially 16C.6.
3 Since 2010, the appointment of a single justice minister, who heads the eleventh
ministry of the executive, exceptionally requires support by ‘parallel consent’; that
is, a majority of the Assembly and a majority of designated nationalists and a
majority of designated unionists see Department of Justice (Northern Ireland) Act
2010 c. 3, Section 2(1).
4 Elliott, reported in the News Letter, 7 June 2011; also see Wilford (2013: 13).
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5 See also Wilford (2013: 13), a persistent critic of d’Hondt.
6 The parties’ responses to the secretary of state’s consultation are provided on the British
government’s website at www gov.uk/government/consultations/measures to improve
the operation of the northern ireland assembly. Wilford (2013: 16 17) also supports the
election of the ﬁrst minister and deputy ﬁrst minister by cross community vote.
7 In a 1999 Standing Order, designation was also used to control the composition of
the executive: passed to prevent an exclusively nationalist executive resulting from
the refusal of unionists to take their seats (and vice versa), it provided that the
executive include at least three nationalists and three unionists.
8 See the Labour Party in Northern Ireland’s response to the Secretary of State’s
Consultation (Northern Ireland Ofﬁce 2012) and the Democratic Unionist Party’s
2012 ‘Reforming Stormont Streamlining Stormont: Making Stormont Work
Better’, reprinted in AERC (2012: 209).
9 See also Schwartz (2010) for a treatment that applies ‘power indices’ developed in
the political science of voting.
10 In 2009 the European Court of Human Rights ruled that Bosnia’s Constitution
breached the Convention because its provisions for the Bosnian presidency
privileged Bosniak, Croat and Serb citizens at the expense of Bosnia’s ‘others’.
See Sejdic and Finci v. Bosnia and Herzegovina (Applications 27996/06 and 34836/06),
22 December 2009, Grand Chamber. For explanation and critical commentary, see
McCrudden and O’Leary (2013a, 2013b).
11 Wilford (2013: 19), hostile towards d’Hondt, writes in his evidence to the Assembly
and Executive Review Committee that ‘the process of government formation
[in Belgium] is protracted to the point where some believe its continuance as a state
is questionable’, but his alternative of an executive ratiﬁed by cross community
consent would be open to the same dangerous delays that occur in Belgium.
12 Correspondence between Brendan O’Leary and Steven Verbanck, Brussels, 2012.
13 Correspondence between John McGarry and Dr Neophytos Loizides.
14 For further critical appraisal of these cases see Cheeseman and Blessing Miles (2010).
15 Of 31 individual responses to the secretary of state’s consultation paper on the issue
of reducing the size of the Assembly, all but two favoured a reduction in size
(Northern Ireland Ofﬁce 2013).
16 The executive is currently 10 ministers (plus justice). The Alliance Party favours
reducing this to eight, the Democratic Unionist Party favours six to eight, and the
Ulster Unionist Party ‘a maximum of 8’. Neither Sinn Féin nor the Social
Democratic and Labour Party committed to a number; see AERC (2012).
17 It is not possible to use this method to simulate a reduction in the number of
Westminster constituencies (from 18 to 17 or 16 while keeping the district
magnitude at six) because the constituencies would change.
18 The Alliance Party, the Greens and the Northern Ireland Labour Party favour a
reduction in the number of members of the Legislative Assembly a position that is
not in their respective parties’ interests.
19 In November 2001 David Trimble of the Ulster Unionist Party and Mark Durkan
of the Social Democratic and Labour Party fell short of election by two unionist
votes, despite securing the support of over 70 per cent of the Assembly. To rescue
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their election, the members of the Alliance Party and Women’s coalition felt obliged
to redesignate from ‘others’ to ‘unionists’, permitting them to win a second vote, but
subjecting the designation rules to ridicule.
20 We count multiple Petitions of Concern tabled on the same day regarding related
amendments (those pertaining to the same piece of legislation) as only a single use.
For a complete and chronological breakdown of the use of the Petition of Concern
by individual bills, amendments, and motions see McCaffrey (2013: Table 3).
21 See Acts of the Northern Ireland Assembly, www.legislation.gov.uk/nia.
22 See Acts of the Scottish Parliament, www.legislation.gov.uk/asp.
23 See, for example, the Northern Ireland Assembly Ofﬁcial Report (Hansard), 6 June
2000, ‘Motion on Union Flag’, http://archive.niassembly.gov.uk/record/reports/
000606.htm#4.
24 See, for example, the Northern Ireland Assembly Ofﬁcial Report (Hansard),
1 October 2001, ‘NI Human Rights Commission’, http://archive.niassembly.gov.uk/
record/reports2008/090209 htm.
25 See, for example, the Northern Ireland Assembly Ofﬁcial Report (Hansard), 7 April
2008 ‘Forkhill Military Site’, http://archive.niassembly.gov.uk/record/reports2007/
080407.htm.
26 For an example of ‘pseudo Petitions of Concern’ (insofar as the issue at stake was
not a matter of particular nationalist/unionist concern), see the Northern Ireland
Assembly Ofﬁcial Report (Hansard), 10 March 2009, ‘Dual Mandates’, http://
archive.niassembly.gov.uk/record/ reports2008/090310.pdf.
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